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Liberty/NEDAP Powervote

Liberty Systems: They’re Baaaack… PDF  | Print |  Email
Liberty Systems
By Bo Lipari, New Yorkers for Verified Voting   
January 29, 2008
DRE Vendor Demands Court Restraining Order

This article was posted at
Bo Lipari's Blog and is reposted here with permission of the author.

I told you we couldn’t get complacent. The DRE vendors are like zombies - every time you think they're dead, they rise right up and come back at you. True to form, just after we thought we’d killed DREs for good in New York State, they're back.

The DRE vendor Liberty has applied for a temporary restraining order in Albany Supreme Court, asking Justice Kimberly O'Connor to allow them to be included on the list of voting machines which can be purchased by counties. Liberty is challenging last week's denial of approval for their DRE by the State Board of Elections, asked the Court to act immediately. However, after 2 hours and 45 minutes of oral argument tonight Justice O'Connor denied the call for an immediate restraining order. A hearing on Liberty's Article 78 proceeding is now scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on Thursday, January 31, 2008.

The Board’s denial of approval was based on the Liberty DREs inability to meet the requirements of Section 7-202(1)(e) of New York State law which states that systems approved by the state board must: “provide the voter an opportunity to privately and independently verify votes selected and the ability to privately and independently change such votes or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted.” As a member of New York’s Citizen Advisory Committee, I evaluated the Liberty DRE along with other systems. It's clear to me that the State Board was correct in denying approval to the DRE because it’s verification mechanism was completely unusable by voters with disabilities.
NEDAP (Liberty Systems) Voting Machines Hacked PDF  | Print |  Email
Liberty Systems
By Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting   
October 05, 2006

The PowerVote Voting System manufactured by the Dutch company NEDAP is marketed in the United States by Liberty Election Systems as the LibertyVote. The website claims that with their voting system,"voters can be rest assured that their votes are securely and accurately processed."


Concerns expressed by many IT professionals about the security of the e-voting system chosen for use in Ireland were today shown to be well-founded when a group of Dutch IT Specialists, using documentation
obtained from the Irish Department of the Environment, demonstrated that the NEDAP e-voting machines could be secretly hacked, made to record inaccurate voting preferences, and could even be secretly reprogrammed to run a chess program.

The recently formed Dutch anti e-voting group, "Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet" (We don't trust voting computers), has revealed on national Dutch television program "EenVandaag" on Nederland 1, that they have successfully hacked the Nedap machines -- identical to the machines purchased for use in Ireland in all important respects.

Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting (ICTE) representative Colm MacCarthaigh, who has seen and examined the compromised Nedap machine in action in Amsterdam, notes "The attack presented by the Dutch group would not need significant modification to run on the Irish systems. The machines use the same construction and components, and differ only in relatively minor aspects such as the presence of extra LEDs to assist voters with the Irish voting system.

Experts Say Dutch Voting Machines Are Unreliable PDF  | Print |  Email
Liberty Systems
By NIS News Bulletin   
July 06, 2006

A group of experts have launched a campaign against the voting machines used in elections in the Netherlands. They say the computers, produced by NEDAP, are unreliable. These are the same machines that are stored in warehouses in Ireland for not being accurate and the same machines being marketed in New York and New Jersey by Libety Systems.


On a website, initiator Rop Gonggrijp explains he wants to check up on elections via voting computers. He is founder of XS4All, the oldest Dutch Internet provider. Gongrijp is backed by people including software writer Peter Knoppers of the University of Delft, researcher Anne-Marie Oostveen of the Rathenau Institute and encryption expert Barry Wels.


In the Netherlands, voting with a pencil is only occasionally still used. Computers are used almost everywhere. This will not be different during the 22 November early general elections.


"Checkups on vote-counting are done by a handful of technicians, test institutions and civil servants," Gonggrijp complains. He wants the source code of the software used to be published. A copy should be made of each vote to allow retrospective checking of the outcome and to be able to carry out a random survey, Knoppers added.


Nederlandsche Apparatenfabriek (Nedap), the company that supplies around 90 percent of the voting machines used in the Netherlands, said it would even consider releasing the source code. "Anyone could then copy our machines", a spokesman explained. Nedap also supplies voting machines to foreign governments.

Irish Voting Group Welcomes Report, Calls for Complete Review of E-Voting Project PDF  | Print |  Email
Liberty Systems
By Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Elections   
July 06, 2006

On July 04, 2006 The Commission on Electronic Voting presented its second report to the Ceann Comhairle concerning its further work in relation to the secrecy, accuracy and testing of the NEDAP/Powervote electronic voting system. NEDAP/Powervote is being marketted in the United States as Liberty Voting Systems. The Commission concluded that while it can recommend the voting and counting equipment of the chosen system for use at elections in Ireland, subject to further work it has also recommended, it is unable to recommend the election management software for such use.


Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting (ICTE) today welcomed the release of the Commission on Electronic Voting's second report on the secrecy and accuracy of the Nedap/Powervote e-voting system. "We are satisfied that this report vindicates our concerns about this e-voting system, particularly the need for a voter verified paper audit trail (p153,4) and the need to entirely replace the vote-management section of the system (p14)" said Margaret McGaley (pictured at right), spokesperson for ICTE.

In response to Minister Roche's determination to continue with the introduction of this system, Ms McGaley highlighted the expense the necessary modifications would entail. "We should not decide to use this system without doing a full cost-benefit analysis both for the system as a whole, and from this point on. The changes laid out by the commission are extensive. They will require a significant investment of both time and money to implement, and we need to ask if this system is worth it. The €60 million that has been spent to date is gone and the futher investment of several years, and millions of euro, will not bring it back."

"We are particularly happy to see, on page 153 and 154, that the commission have explicitly stated that the paper system is superior to the chosen system because the latter does not provide a voter verified paper audit trail." said
Ms McGaley. ICTE maintains that no electronic voting system can be trustworthy unless it includes a paper-based voter verified audit trail (VVAT), a view shared by the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) and the Irish Computer Society (ICS). According to Fergal Daly of ICTE: "After repeated failures of electronic voting systems, many states in the US are enacting laws mandating VVAT. We should learn from their mistakes rather than repeating them."

Serious Inconsistencies Uncovered in E-Voting Pilot Votes (NEDAP Powervote) PDF  | Print |  Email
Liberty Systems
By Colm MacCarthaigh, Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting   
July 14, 2005
Link to 04-04 Press Release

Documentation released under the Freedom of Information (FoI) Act [1], [2], [3], [4] reveals that there were serious inconsistencies with the counts in two of the constituencies in which evoting was piloted in 2002. This information is contained in the Dublin County returning officer's reports on the use of evoting for 2002 Dáil election and Nice II referendum obtained by Mr Joe McCarthy under FoI.

Contrary to claims by Minister for The Environment, Heritage and Local Government, Mr Martin Cullen T.D. [5], [6], significant anomalies were discovered in the election results employing the Nedap/Powervote system at the time of the 2002 election and referendum. "Specific claims of `the earlier successful use of the system in Ireland in three constituencies at the 2002 general election' [7] are misleading, misinformed and mistaken" commented Mr Dermot Casey of the Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting (ICTE).

In the case of the Dáil Election in the Dublin West Constituency, these reports indicate the Presiding Officer recorded 29,272 votes as having been cast. The Nedap/Powervote modules recorded 29,988 votes as having being cast, a difference of 716 votes. These 716 unexplained votes represent 2.4% of those who voted in the constituency of Dublin West.
Vendor Pages
Voting Equipment Vendors
Advanced Voting Solutions
Danaher Corporation (Guardian Voing Systems)
Election Systems and Software (ES&S)
Hart Intercivic
Liberty/NEDAP Powervote
VoteHere (Dategrity)
Voter Database Vendors
VoTing Technologies International
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